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Abstract—Existence of spam URLs over emails and Online
Social Media (OSM) has become a massive e-crime. To counter
the dissemination of long complex URLs in emails and character
limit imposed on various OSM (like Twitter), the concept of URL
shortening has gained a lot of traction. URL shorteners take
as input a long URL and output a short URL with the same
landing page (as in the long URL) in return. With their immense
popularity over time, URL shorteners have become a prime target
for the attackers giving them an advantage to conceal malicious
content. Bitly, a leading service among all shortening services
is being exploited heavily to carry out phishing attacks, work-
from-home scams, pornographic content propagation, etc. This
imposes additional performance pressure on Bitly and other URL
shorteners to be able to detect and take a timely action against
the illegitimate content. In this study, we analyzed a dataset of
763,160 short URLs marked suspicious by Bitly in the month of
October 2013. Our results reveal that Bitly is not using its claimed
spam detection services very effectively. We also show how a
suspicious Bitly account goes unnoticed despite of a prolonged
recurrent illegitimate activity. Bitly displays a warning page on
identification of suspicious links, but we observed this approach
to be weak in controlling the overall propagation of spam. We also
identified some short URL based features and coupled them with
two domain specific features to classify a Bitly URL as malicious
or benign and achieved an accuracy of 86.41%. The feature set
identified can be generalized to other URL shortening services
as well. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first large scale
study to highlight the issues with the implementation of Bitly’s
spam detection policies and proposing suitable countermeasures. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
URL shortening is a technique of mapping a long Uni-
form Resource Locator (URL) to a short URL redirecting
to the same landing page. Initially, the concept was used to
prevent breaking of complex URLs while copying text, to
accommodate long URLs without line breaks, and for smooth
dissemination of content. Usage of these services nowadays
has become a trend in Online Social Media (OSM); content
length restriction imposed by various OSMs (e.g. Twitter’s 140
character limit) has helped popularize their use even further.
In order to accommodate more content in their tweet, users
prefer to compress their long URLs using URL shortening
services. Some popular URL shortening services like bit.ly and
goo.gl track URLs and provide real time click traffic analysis
[25], [29]. Although these services are created to comfort the
1We thank Bitly for sharing the data with us. In particular, we have
interacted with Brian Eoff, Lead Data Scientist at Bitly by sharing our analysis
and getting his reactions to our conclusions.
users, spammers have found their ways to target and misuse
the facility for their benefit.
URL shorteners do not only reduce the URL length but also
obfuscate the actual URL behind a shortened link. Spammers
take advantage of this obfuscation to misguide the netizens
by posting malicious links on OSM. These malicious links
can be: i) spam - irrelevant messages sent to large number of
people online, ii) scam - online fraud to mislead people, iii)
phishing - online fraud to get user credentials, or iv) malware
- auto downloadable content to damage the system. 2 Link
obfuscation makes short URL spam more difficult to detect
than traditional long URL spam. Malicious long URLs can
be detected with a direct domain lookup or a simple blacklist
check, while short URLs can easily escape such technique.
Lexical methods to detect long URL spam work slow for
short URLs because of additional redirects. Malicious short
URL detection therefore requires more efficient spam detection
techniques. According to a threat activity report by Symantec
in year 2010 [20], around 65% malicious URLs on OSM
were shortened URLs. Another study in 2012 investigated a
particular URL shortening service (qr.cx) and revealed that
around 80% of shortened URLs from this service contained
spam-related content [2]. Research by a URL shortener yi.tl
reveals that because of deep penetration of spam, 614 out of
1,002 URL shortening services became non-functional in year
2012. 3 A recent article highlights that Facebook spammers
make close to 200 million dollar through posting these short-
ened links to lure users [21].
Bitly, launched in year 2008 is one of the most popular
URL shortening services on the web [18]. It gained major
traction when Twitter started to use it as a default URL
shortener in year 2009 before the launch of its own service,
t.co in the year 2011. 4 Bitly provides an interface to its users
to either shorten a link anonymously or create an account
to shorten the links. Each link shortened by a user has a
unique global hash (an aggregated identifier corresponding to
a link). Such shortened links, known as bitmarks can then be
saved, tracked, and shared. Users are also allowed to connect
any number of Facebook / Twitter accounts with their Bitly
accounts, making the task of shortening and sharing a link
very convenient. With 1 billion new links shortened on Bitly
2This is not a comprehensive list and there can be other type of illegitimate
content that we did not mention here.
3http://www.webpronews.com/study-claims-61-of-url-shorteners-are-dead-
2012-05
4https://support.twitter.com/articles/109623-about-twitter-s-link-service-
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each day and 6 billion clicks each month, spammers have been
exploiting the service to a great extent [27]. In early 2013, a
news article reported the spread of phishing attacks on Twitter
through Direct Messages (DM) with malicious Bitly links. 5
Large number of users fell in the trap and clicked on the link,
which redirected to a website that replicated Twitter’s login
page. Victims were then misled to believe that their session was
expired and were made to login again, unknowingly revealing
their Twitter credentials to the attacker. Impact of the attack
was such that Twitter announced a temporary restriction on
sending shortened links including Bitly in DMs. 6
In another attack, spammers abused the redirect vulnera-
bilities of a popular legitimate domain belonging to the U.S.
federal government, which had collaboration with Bitly. The
hijacked domain 1.usa.gov which redirected to an illegitimate
work-from-home scam website received around 43,049 clicks
from 124 countries within a week. 7 This shows that even
branded short domains by Bitly are not safe from exploits
[28]. In October 2013, Bitly also experienced a massive DDoS
attack rendering complete shutdown of its services for close
to 7 hours. 8 Some spammers have started to build their
own URL shortening services to double-shorten the malicious
links, first with a self created short URL service, then with
a legitimate short URL service to evade security checks. 9
Security researchers from Symantec found that spammers used
Bitly URLs to propagate sexually suggestive content [16].
Unlike other URL shortening services like goo.gl and ow.ly,
Bitly does not provide a CAPTCHA to test human identity at
the time of URL shortening. For protection against spam, Bitly
claims to use real-time spam detection services like Google
safebrowsing and SURBL, and flags 2-3 millions links as spam
each week [23], [24], [26]. Bitly neither deletes a flagged
suspicious link nor suspends the associated user; but displays a
warning page whenever such a link is clicked. Such a warning
page is by-passable and does not completely restrict a user to
visit the malicious website. Also, non-deletion of illegitimate
content or account can make it viral over web. Despite of all
these detection measures adopted by Bitly, there is continued
existence of malicious Bitly URLs. It is therefore important
to have an in depth understanding of the gaps in Bitly’s
spam detection techniques that deter its efficiency to handle
malicious content. This paper deals with the identification of
such gaps and highlights some countermeasures which can be
adopted by Bitly to be able to detect malicious content more
effectively.
In this work, we perform a detailed analysis on a dataset
of suspicious Bitly links and their associated attributes to
characterize Bitly spam and explore its spam detection policies.
Major contributions of this paper are: leftmargin=0.4cm
• Impact analysis of malicious Bitly links on OSM:
5http://news.softpedia.com/news/Twitter-Phishing-Scam-This-Profile-Is-
Spreading-Nasty-Blogs-Around-About-You-318618.shtml
6http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/twitter-may-be-banning-links-
in-dms/#!CvRAI
7http://www.pcworld.com/article/2012800/spammers-abuse-gov-url-
shortener-service-in-workathome-scams.html
8http://www.geeknewscentral.com/2013/10/21/twitter-banning-bit-ly-other-
url-shortners-on-direct-messages-dm/
9http://www.geek.com/news/fake-short-url-services-latest-tactic-for-
spammers-1382555/
There exist large communities propagating malicious
content through Bitly on Twitter. Such communities
can grow in size if Bitly does not impose any limit on
the number of connected OSM accounts.
• Identification of issues in Bitly’s spam detection: We
found that Bitly is unable to detect malicious links
tracked by popular blacklist services and is not using
its claimed spam detection techniques very effectively.
Spammers exploit Bitly’s no account suspension pol-
icy and keep shortening malicious URLs.
• Machine learning classification to detect malicious
Bitly URLs: Our classification mechanism relies on the
combination of long and short URL based features and
we attained an accuracy of 86.41%. Our technique can
work efficiently irrespective of the number of clicks
received by a Bitly URL.
To the best our knowledge, this is the first large scale study
to highlight the issues with Bitly’s spam detection policies
and propose a suitable solution. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related work and
Section 3 explains our data collection methodology. Analysis
and results are covered in Section 4 and 5. Section 6 contains
the conclusive summary and Section 7 presents some future
directions and limitations of our research.
II. RELATED WORK
URL shortening services take as input a long
URL (e.g. http://blog.bitly.com/post/138381844/spam-
and-malware-protection) and generates a short URL
(e.g. bit.ly/RSwVGo) in return. Short URL so generated
redirects to the same long URL but looks random and
unrelated to the actual link. Imposed character limit has
lead to immense popularity of such services in social media
landscape. Due to their ubiquitous usage, these services have
been hit by adversaries to obfuscate and disseminate malicious
content. This section presents the work done in understanding
the usage pattern, behavior, and misuse of short URLs.
A. Malicious Long URL Characterization / Detection
A number of studies have been conducted to understand
the propagation of spam on OSM, many of which revealed
heavy usage of URLs to spread malicious content. Benevenuto
et al. in their research identified distinctive features to detect
spammers on Twitter [8]. Researchers also evaluated the effec-
tiveness of popular blacklists in evading spam and observed
it to be inefficient. On Twitter, checking blacklists becomes
even slower because of the URL shortening services used to
obfuscate long URLs. Using these services, a spammer can
complicate the process of detection by using chains of multiple
shortenings [10]. Thomas et al. in 2011 developed a system
called Monarch which classifies a URL submitted to any web
service as malicious or benign in real time [6]. This system
relies on the features of URL landing page (like page content,
hosting infrastructure, etc.) and detected malicious links with
an accuracy close to 91%. In year 2012, Aggarwal et al. also
proposed a real time phishing detection system for Twitter,
called PhishAri [9]. Authors coupled the Twitter and URL
based features to classify phishing tweets and achieved an
accuracy of 92.52%. In another real time suspicious URL
detection technique on Twitter proposed by Lee et al., authors
addressed the problem of conditional URL redirects [11]. A
combined feature set of correlated URL redirects and tweet
context information was used and authors attained an accuracy
of 86.3%.
B. Short URL Analysis
With the introduction of short URLs in OSM, a compar-
ative study is necessary to be able to understand the level of
acceptance of short URLs over long URLs. Kandylas et al.
performed a comparative study of long and short Bitly URLs
propagation on Twitter and found that Bitly links received
orders of magnitude more clicks than an equal random set of
long URLs [5]. To further comprehend short URL distinctive
characteristics, Antoniades et al. studied the lifetime of short
URLs which revealed that the life span of 50% short URLs
exceeds 100 days. Other than this generic analysis, Neumann
et al. looked at malicious short URLs in emails and highlighted
their privacy and security implications [1]. Chhabra et al. also
gave an overview of evolving phishing attacks through short
URLs on Twitter and found that phishers use URL shorteners
not only to gain space but hide their malicious links [13].
Their results show that most of the tweets containing phishing
URLs comes from inorganic (automated) accounts. Later in
year 2012, Klien et al. presented the global usage pattern of
short URLs by setting up their own URL shortening service
and found 80% short URL content to be spam related [2]. In
year 2013, Maggi et al. performed a large scale study on 25
million short URLs belonging to 622 distinct URL shortening
services [4]. Their results highlight that the countermeasures
adopted by these services to detect spam are not very effective
and can be easily by-passed. Experimental results from their
data shows that Bitly allows users to shorten malicious links
and does not include any initial level lightweight check to
prevent it (though detects it after some time). Unlike their
study which focused on multiple URL shorteners, our research
is an in depth analysis of the effectiveness of a single URL
shortener. Another scheme was proposed by Yoon et al. in
year 2013 about using relative words of target URLs in short
URLs [14]. This can give hints to user to guess the target URL,
making it comparatively safe from phishing attacks.
C. Malicious Short URL Characterization / Detection
There is little research done in the area of malicious short
URL characterization. One such work that presents short URL
based features to detect malicious accounts is given by Wang
et al. in year 2013 [12]. In their experiment, they investigated
the creators of 600,000 short Bitly URLs and associated click
traffic from different countries and referrers. Based on the
analysis, they classify a link as spam / non-spam using only 3
click traffic based features with maximum accuracy of 90.81%,
but ignored all short URLs with zero clicks. Our study on the
other hand incorporates all URLs irrespective of their click
state. In addition, their results reveal that legitimate Bitly users
also generate spam and most clicks on short malicious URLs
comes from popular websites.
After reviewing the above literature, it is evident that a lot
of work has been done in the identification and analysis of
malicious URLs. Surprisingly, very little work has been done
in analyzing only suspicious short URLs to expose the gaps in
security mechanisms adopted by a specific URL shortener. Our
work significantly differs from the prior studies, as we focus
on understanding in depth, the loopholes in spam detection
mechanisms of a URL shortening service. We also propose
and evaluate a semi supervised classification framework for
spam detection in URL shorteners.
III. DATA COLLECTION
For our experimental dataset, we followed a two-phase
approach. In the first phase, we acquired a dataset of suspicious
Bitly URLs from Bitly and collected their associated attributes
to explore the issues with Bitly’s spam detection techniques. In
the second phase, we collected a dataset of Bitly URLs from
Twitter and used machine learning algorithms to classify an
unknown Bitly URL as malicious or benign. We call a Bitly
URL as benign if it is non-malicious and trustworthy.
A. Data Collection Methodology (Phase 1)
To analyze the basic characteristics of short URL spam,
we requested Bitly to share with us the links that they mark as
suspicious. We received a dataset of 763,160 suspicious Bitly
URLs which displayed a Bitly warning page in the month
of October 2013. This dataset comprised of the global hash,
associated long URL, and number of warning pages displayed
for the global hash. We call this the link-dataset. Bitly also
provides a public API 10 to extract the link and user metrics
for a particular short URL. Using the link-dataset as our seed
input to Bitly API, we collected analytics for 144,851 (18.98%)
links between January 2014 to March 2014 (our data collection
is still on). Table I presents information about these analytics.
We call this the link-metric-dataset.
Short URL metric Output data
info link creator and creation time
expand target long URL
clicks last 1,000 click history
referring domains domains referring click traffic
to the given Bitly URL
encoders users who created the given
Bitly URL
encoder info Bitly profile name, creation
date, and connected networks
encoder link his-
tory
last 100 links of the encoder
TABLE I: Data we obtained for the suspicious Bitly links.
B. Data Collection Methodology (Phase 2)
In order to collect an unlabeled dataset (mix of benign
and malicious), we used Twitter Rest API 11 and its “search”
method to get only tweets with a Bitly URL. Here we restricted
our search query to “bit.ly” and collected a total of 412,139
tweets with 34,802 distinct Bitly URLs between 12 February
10http://dev.bitly.com/api.html
11https://dev.twitter.com/docs/api/1.1
2014 to 15 March 2014. We refer to this as the unlabeled-
dataset in the rest of this paper. To obtain a labeled dataset,
we queried Google Safebrowsing, SURBL, PhishTank, and
VirusTotal 12 APIs to find whether the URLs from unlabeled-
dataset are malicious or not. Google Safebrowsing is a repos-
itory of suspected phishing or malware pages maintained by
Google Inc. The Google Safebrowsing API accepts an HTTP
GET / POST request to lookup a URL and returns a JSON
object describing whether the URL is “phishing”, “malware”,
or “ok”. SURBL is a consolidated list of websites that appear
in unsolicited messages. SURBL lookup feature allows a
user to check a domain name against the ones blacklisted
by SURBL. We used SURBL client library implemented in
python. 13 PhishTank is a public crowdsourced database of
phishing URLs where contributors submit suspicious URLs
and volunteers label them as phishing or legitimate. 14 The
PhishTank API uses an HTTP post request and returns the
status of a URL in standard JSON format. VirusTotal is
an aggregated information warehouse of malicious links and
domains as marked by 52 website scanning engines and
contributed by users. The VirusTotal API also allows an HTTP
POST request and gives a JSON response indicating results
from all website scanning engines it uses. To label our dataset,
we mark a Bitly URL as malicious if the expanded URL or
domain is detected by any of these blacklists.
In addition, we also label a Bitly URL as malicious if it is
detected by Bitly itself. Bitly uses various blacklisting services
and other measures to detect spam and throws a warning
page whenever it identifies a malicious URL. We perform this
check for all Bitly URLs in our unlabeled-dataset and label a
URL as malicious if a warning page is displayed. Using these
techniques, we obtained 8,000 distinct malicious Bitly URLs
from our unlabeled-dataset of 34,802 Bitly URLs. We call
this the labeled-dataset. Figure 1 shows this data collection
process.
Fig. 1: Data collection and labeling.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section, we focus on the analysis of dataset obtained
from Bitly. Our objective is to highlight some characteristics
of malicious short URLs and to underline the weaknesses in
security mechanisms used by Bitly. We attempt to answer
some unexplored questions related to short URL spam like:
(i) What are the characteristics of domains from where such
malicious content is originating? (ii) Does malicious Bitly links
have an impact on OSM? (iii) Is Bitly using the claimed
12https://www.virustotal.com/
13https://pypi.python.org/pypi/surblclient/
14https://www.phishtank.com/
spam detection services effectively? (iv) Do spammers take
advantage of Bitly’s no account suspension policy? (v) Does a
warning page alone help curtail the overall problem of spam?
(vi) How quick is Bitly in identifying suspicious accounts?
Answering these questions is important to investigate
Bitly’s competence in dealing with illegitimate content. A
detailed investigation is needed to understand the ground issues
with Bitly’s malicious content detection policies in order to
make it more effective.
A. Domain Analysis
Quick and easy availability of domains has made the task
of a spammer more convenient. Our link-dataset of 763,160
suspicious URLs comprised of 22,038 unique domains. Since
our target was to analyze only the malicious domains, we
realized that the spammers often exploit some legitimate
popular domains to propagate spam. Keeping this in mind,
we used APWG (Anti-Phishing Working Group 15) whitelist
and separated all the legitimate domains from our link-dataset.
We found that 56 domains marked suspicious by Bitly were
whitelisted by APWG. Ignoring these, we created a python
crawler and performed a test on the existence of each sus-
picious domain 5 months after we received our dataset. We
observed that 83.06% domains no longer existed. This high-
lights that such domains are actually short lived and created
with a dedicated purpose of spamming. To further estimate the
average number of times users tried to visit the links from such
domains, we looked at the cumulative count of corresponding
Bitly warning pages. Total number of click requests made to
the URLs belonging to non-functional domains only in the
month of October was found to be 9,937,250. Spammers thus
focus on buying domains to host malicious content and most
of these domains eventually die after achieving a good number
of hits.
B. Connected Network Impact Analysis
Bitly allows its users to connect to any number of Facebook
/ Twitter accounts. This help users to shorten and share links
at one click on the connected OSM. In this section, we present
how Bitly users take advantage of this service for spamming.
To investigate, we first extracted all the encoders 16 of URLs
in our link-metric-dataset and found 12,344 distinct Bitly
users from 413,119 malicious Bitly URLs. Next, we used
the Bitly API to collect information about their connected
social network and found 3,415 (63.54%) users connected only
Twitter, 951 (17.69%) only Facebook, and 1,009 (18.77%)
connected both. Possible explanation for low Facebook con-
nections could be that Bitly allows a user to connect a personal
Facebook account for free, but linking Facebook brand or fan
pages is a paid service. 17 This might restrict spammers to
disseminate more malicious content in public, but there is no
such documented limitation for Twitter.
On further inspection, we found that 507 Bitly users con-
nected multiple Twitter accounts of which 28 users connected
15http://www.antiphishing.org/
16We use ‘encoders’ and ‘users’ interchangeably.
17http://support.bitly.com/knowledgebase/articles/76455-how-do-i-connect-
my-facebook-and-twitter-account-t
at least 10 Twitter accounts. To analyze these 28 suspicious
profiles, we extracted their last 200 tweets using Twitter Rest
API. Twitter API gives last 200 tweets of a profile on a
single request, and we believe it to be a reasonable sample
for our study. Our target was to compare multiple profiles
connected by each user and infer a possible reason behind
their connection. We extracted the URLs posted by all Twitter
accounts connected to one Bitly user and did a cross URL /
domain comparison. For this we computed pair wise Jaccard
similarity score 18 followed by the overall variance. We also
collected the link history (last 100) of these users using the
Bitly API. All these links were checked for a Bitly warning
page by making GET requests in python. At last, we manually
inspected these accounts by looking at the tweet text and URL
similarity scores. From this we identified 3 different cross-
network communities that existed across Bitly and Twitter in
our dataset:
1) Community 1: The first community consisted of 27 Bitly
users with 1 associated Twitter account each. All these users
shortened links from the same domain and had similar looking
user handles starting with “o ” followed by some random
string (e.g. o 16ee0qg6i6). Last 100 links shortened by all
these users redirected to a Bitly warning page. Also, all the
associated Twitter accounts were suspended when we checked
these profiles later and the Bitly profiles looked dormant. This
behavior confirms the existence of this malicious community
which used Bitly as a medium to propagate spam on Twitter.
2) Community 2: Another community comprised of 2 Bitly
users with 28 associated Twitter accounts each. Also, during
the course of our study one of these Bitly accounts connected
2 more Twitter accounts. Thirteen of the accounts did not exist
when we rechecked and other 45 looked malicious and shared
similar tweet text and URLs. This community appears to be
conducting an active spam campaign.
3) Community 3: The third community composed of 2
Bitly accounts with 9 Twitter accounts each. All these 18
Twitter accounts shared similar explicit pornographic content.
On a manual inspection of this Bitly profiles, their last activity
was a year before and they were no longer shortening URLs.
On the contrary, they were still posting tweets from their
Twitter accounts. This shows that this malicious community
is dormant on Bitly but still active on Twitter.
These communities originated from Bitly to spread mali-
cious content on Twitter. Presence of such big communities
propagating malicious content clearly highlights the abuse
of connected social network on Bitly. Bitly should therefore
impose a restriction on the number of OSM accounts a user
can connect.
C. Analysis of Bitly’s spam detection techniques
Till now, we looked at a generalized characterization of
malicious Bitly links by studying the domains they arrive from
and the connected social network. The above results highlight
that spammers use Bitly as a start point to propagate spam
over other media. It now becomes important to comprehend
whether Bitly is taking enough measures to deal with such
content and the users it is coming from. In this section, we do
a focused study to understand how Bitly reacts in this situation.
18http://www.stanford.edu/∼maureenh/quals/html/ml/node68.html
1) Efficiency Analysis: To infer the efficiency of Bitly in
detection of malicious links and users, we conduct a two-step
experiment.
Comparison With Popular Blacklists
We performed a check for malicious Bitly links detected by
3 popular blacklist services- APWG, VirusTotal, and SURBL.
To collect data from APWG, we requested for APWG’s live
feed service and set it up on MySql database. We collected
the data for 6 months (October 2013 - March 2014) and
obtained a total of 142,660 and a daily feed of around 746
APWG marked malicious links. On a direct lookup, we got
216 Bitly links from this dataset. In order to extract more
Bitly links, we performed a reverse lookup by shortening
the long malicious URLs and checking their existence on
Bitly using Bitly API. Whenever a link is shortened using
Bitly API, it returns a parameter called new hash, indicating
whether this link is shortened for the first time or is pre-
existent. We collected only the pre-existent links. With the
direct and reverse lookup, a total of 2,872 APWG marked
malicious Bitly links were obtained. We also made GET
requests to Bitly to check if it gives a warning page for these
malicious URLs. To our surprise, Bitly could not detect 2,490
of 2,872 (86.70%) malicious links. Though Bitly does not
claim to use APWG, but such high non-detection rate looks
alarming as APWG is a popular and trusted source to detect
phishing. In addition to APWG, we also collected malicious
links marked by VirusTotal over the same time period. For this,
we implemented a web crawler and set up a cron job to perform
daily look ups on VirusTotal and received 569 malicious Bitly
links. We again checked these links for a Bitly warning page
and found 407 of 569 (71.53%) links undetected by Bitly.
These results clearly highlights that Bitly misses on a lot of
malicious content.
In addition to these popular blacklists which Bitly does
not claim to use, we considered a third measure (SURBL)
that Bitly professes to apply. To check against SURBL, we
used Bitly API to collect the link history (last 100 or less) of
all encoders in our link-metric-dataset. We received 717,644
Bitly links from 12,344 distinct Bitly encoders contributing to
63,693 distinct domains. On checking these links for a Bitly
warning page and the corresponding domains against SURBL,
we found 275 (36.66%) domains blacklisted by SURBL but
undetected by Bitly. These 275 domains contributed to 2,244
links in our dataset. Figure 2 presents the frequency distribu-
tion of undetected domains with occurrence more than one.
Inset in the same Figure starting from domain freeloadfile.ru
highlights the frequency distribution more clearly. This shows
that there were multiple Bitly links corresponding to 129 of
these domains, maximum being 329 for domain timesfancy.in.
Also, there were 16 domains with frequency more than 50.
These results show that in addition to other popular blacklists,
Bitly is also not using the claimed spam detection services
very effectively. Such undetected domains contribute to a large
number of links if looked at a greater scale. Thus, letting
bypass a single malicious domain can act as an invitation to a
huge amount of illegitimate content.
Suspicious User Profile Identification
After looking at the inefficiency of Bitly in identifying
suspicious links, we proceeded with the detection of suspicious
Fig. 2: Frequency distribution of SURBL domains undetected by Bitly (with frequency more than 1). Blacklisted domain timesfancy.in has
the maximum frequency and 16 domains have frequency greater than 50. Inset: Starting from domain freeloadfile.ru shows the frequency
distribution within the graph more clearly.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: (a) Cumulative distribution on number of Bitly users posting suspicious links. (b) Link history timeline for user bamsesang. The link
sharing interval and click pattern clearly reflects the malicious activity being carried out for a long time.
Bitly accounts. On the analysis of all links in encoder’s
link history, we obtained 112,697 links redirecting to a Bitly
warning page (12,344 encoders), giving us more suspicious
URLs. To compute the fraction of suspicious links shortened
by these encoders, we assigned a Suspicion Factor (Sus Fac)
for each as :
Sus Fac =
#Links redirecting to warning page
#total links collected
(1)
We define Sus Fac as the ratio of shortened links giving a Bitly
warning page to the total links collected for each encoder.
Figure 3(a) shows the cumulative distribution of number of
Bitly users based on their Sus Fac. The graph shows that
12,344 users had a Sus Fac less than or equal to 1, and
10,326 users had a Sus Fac less than or equal to 0.99. This
means that 2,018 (12,344 - 10,326) out of 12,344 encoders
(16.35%) had a Sus Fac = 1, indicating that they shortened
only suspicious links. Also 2,558 encoders (20.72%) had at
least 80% of their shortened URLs as malicious (Sus Fac
>= 0.8). This clearly highlights the malicious intent of these
encoders on creating their Bitly accounts. As of now, Bitly
follows a no user suspension policy and does not even delete
a malicious link. 19 This facilitates the continued existence of
a large number of encoders with such evil motives. All these
accounts still exist (as of January 2014) and look legitimate
on viewing their profile. Its only when a user visits multiple
links from these profiles leading to malicious content, he gets
to know that the profile is created for a dedicated purpose
of spamming. This approach is quite different from that
followed by Twitter, wherein a suspicious user once detected
is immediately suspended to prevent further dissemination of
malicious content. 20 Looking at the extent to which spammers
are leveraging the policies used by Bitly, it becomes important
for Bitly to also create policies to mitigate this problem. One
simple solution could be to assign a credibility score (like
19http://blog.bitly.com/post/138381844/spam-and-malware-protection
20https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules
Sus Fac) to each profile to apprise the users visiting that profile
of upcoming risks, if any. This approach has also been explored
by Gupta et al. wherein a tweet can be assigned a credibility
score based on certain relevant features [22].
2) Promptness Analysis: Results in the above experiment
clearly shows how Bitly users keep shortening only malicious
URLs. Till this point of our study, it was unknown to us how
Bitly reacts to suspicious user profiles. To report our findings
and get some insights, we made a blog entry on our initial data
analysis. 21 Figure 4 present some comments on our blog by
a Lead Data Scientist from Bitly, in which he informed that
Bitly does not suspend user accounts but forbids suspicious
users from creating any new links. Also, since this information
is only known to Bitly and the user, we could not get this
data. To verify this claim, we performed another experiment
to observe the promptness of Bitly in detecting suspicious
profiles. For this, we only considered the highly suspicious
Fig. 4: Brian’s (Lead Data Scientist at Bitly) reply to out Twitter post
about the blog.
profiles obtained from the last experiment (Section IV-C1).
We label a profile as highly suspicious if it has a Sus Fac of
1. Using this filter, we obtained 80 highly suspicious profiles
in our dataset. encoder link history metric from the Bitly API
was then used to extract the creation time and number of clicks
for all 100 links from each profile. At last, we cumulated the
number of links created and clicks received per month and
formulated a timeline for each user. The maximum month
lag of shortening malicious links that we observed was 24
months for user bamsesang (Figure 3(b)), followed by 18
months for user iplayonlinegames. The timeline shows that
user bamsesang shortened all malicious links for 7 months,
remained inactive for close to 1 year and then shortened
malicious URLs again. On plotting a similar timeline, we
found that user iplayonlinegames remained active throughout.
These users posted links even when the number of clicks
21http://precog.iiitd.edu.in/blog/2013/12/bitly-could-do-better/
received were less. This highlights that they might be posting
links randomly and not monitoring their impact. In contrast,
some malicious links shortened by these users received a
significant number of hits. Out of 80 highly suspicious users
that we labeled, 7 users posted only malicious links for more
than 5 months. Hence, users shorten only malicious URLs for
a prolonged time without getting detected. These results show
an extreme delay in suspicious user identification (if at all) by
Bitly.
All this was observed when we only took into consideration
past 100 continuous malicious links for each user. There could
have been highly active suspicious users who shortened 100 or
more malicious links within a single day. Number of months
between shortening the first and last suspicious URL by such
users could be very high if all their links are studied. Since
Bitly API gives only last 100 entries in a single request, this
would have required making multiple requests per user to
capture the complete link history. We did not do this in our
study due to space and time constraints. But in order to check
if these highly suspicious users have actually been forbidden
by Bitly, we collected their recent link history (after 1 January
2014). We found that 4 of these 80 users were still active and
propagating malicious content. Even for the rest, it cannot be
said if they have been prohibited from link creation by Bitly
or themselves did not create more links. This looks contrary
to Bitly’s assertion that it disallows suspicious users to shorten
more links. This evidently signifies the ease of penetration of
spammers on Bitly and delay in its suspicious user detection
process which it actually claims to follow.
3) Analyzing the effectiveness of Bitly warning page: After
identifying an extreme delay in the detection of suspicious
user profiles by Bitly, we inspected if the access to all popular
malicious Bitly links eventually die out after Bitly discovers
them. Here we define popular malicious Bitly links as the
ones with high number of warning pages displayed. This is
important to study because it gives a clear picture about the
persistence of already identified malicious URL propagation
through Bitly network. Also, we restricted our study to only
popular links because we wanted to capture the URLs with
high overall impact.
We extracted the top 1,000 Bitly links from our link-dataset
based on the number of warning pages reported in the month
of October 2013. Bitly API was then used to collect the click
history of all these links. Next, we determined and separated
the links which got recently clicked (after January 2014).
Using this measure, we found 352 out of 1,000 malicious
links (35.2%) were also being actively clicked in year 2014.
This sample study shows that even though Bitly detected these
suspicious links months before, users are still getting trapped
and visiting these links. These results help us comprehend
that a by-passable Bitly warning page alone is not a strong
enough measure to curtail the dissemination of spam. Hence,
an improved approach could be that Bitly should not only
throw a warning page but also block the visit on popular
malicious Bitly links already detected.
V. BITLY LINK CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we first describe the feature set used to
classify a Bitly URL as malicious or benign. Next, we explain
the classification algorithms followed by the experimental
setup and results.
A. Feature Selection
Long URL based features to classify a malicious link has
been studied over years. Our target was to inspect if short
URL based features also hold some distinctive properties to
identify a malicious URL. Since it is difficult to capture the
intrinsic characteristics of a landing page by using short URL
based features alone, we coupled short URL (Bitly specific)
and some long URL based (WHOIS based) features.
1) WHOIS based features: WHOIS is a query-response
protocol that gives information like domain name, domain
creation / updation date and domain expiration date for a
particular URL. This information is particularly useful to
detect domains which are intentionally created for malicious
purposes. We used 2 WHOIS based features: leftmargin=0.4cm
• Domain age: Most spammers prefer to register their
domains for a short duration and also change the do-
mains frequently to evade detection. In Section IV-A,
we observed 83.06% malicious domains to be non-
existent when we rechecked them after 5 months. This
shows that malicious domains are usually short lived.
• Difference between Link and domain creation: It
is commonly observed that suspicious domains are
created / updated just before they are actually used.
Hence, we used the difference between domain and
Bitly link creation time as one of our feature.
2) Bitly specific features: Bitly provides a detailed ana-
lytics about each link it shortens. These analytics contain a
lot of hidden properties that can help segregate malicious and
benign links. We identified some Bitly specific features and
divided these as Non-Click based and Click based. Non-Click
based features define general characteristics of a Bitly URL
and are independent of its click history whereas Click based
features depends on the click analytics of a Bitly link.
Three Non-Click based features are: leftmargin=0.4cm
• Link creation hour: Malicious users often rely on
automated mechanisms to shorten and share the links.
Link shortening timestamp patterns in case of such
automation might not be similar to the genuine us-
age trend. Such a behavior can thus be captured by
tracking link creation hour of the Bitly links.
• Number of encoders: Encoders are users who shorten
a link using Bitly. Number of encoders correspond-
ing to a Bitly URL depicts its popularity. Malicious
communities take advantage of this feature by cre-
ating multiple identities to shorten the same link
(section IV-B). This feature can be used in order to
detect the presence of such suspicious communities.
• Type of encoders: Encoders can either be regular
Bitly users or users who use some third party services
provided by Bitly. These third party services provide a
single interface to shorten and share the links on multi-
ple OSM. 22 Since we collected our data using Twitter,
22https://bitly.com/pages/partners
we focused on only Twitter based applications like
Twitterfeed 23, TweetDeck API 24, and Tweetbot 25,
etc. In addition to these services, various Bitly links
were also shortened anonymously by users for which
Bitly gives the encoder information as “someone” or
“anonymous”. In the link-metric-dataset, we observed
traces of users who hide their identities and shorten
malicious links. Anonymous Bitly link shortening and
third party service usage can therefore be used as a
feature to identify malicious links.
Two Click based features are: leftmargin=0.4cm
• Link creation-click lag: Antoniades et al. stated that
most legitimate short URLs are clicked on the same
day they are created [3]. The average lifetime of
malicious short URLs have also been reported to
be higher than that of the legitimate ones [4]. This
gives a notion that malicious short URLs do not gain
immediate popularity and the number of clicks on
such URLs evolve slowly. Hence, we included link
creation-click lag as a characteristic feature to capture
how quick the short URL resolves.
• Type of referring domains: A previous study [12]
reveals that large fraction of malicious Bitly URLs
get clicked directly through email clients, messengers,
chat applications, SMS, etc. Thus, we used the fraction
of referring domains that contributes to direct clicks
as another feature for our classification.
B. Machine Learning Classification
Now we describe the mechanisms used in our classification
of malicious short URLs. The experiments involved a 3 step
process – i) creating a labeled dataset, ii) training the suitable
machine learning classifier, and iii) testing an unlabeled dataset
on the trained classifier. In order to assess the most appropriate
and efficient mechanism to detect malicious short URLs, we
inspected various machine learning classifiers which were best
suited for our study. For this, we used the popular classification
algorithms implemented in Weka software package [15]. Weka
is an open source collection of machine learning classifiers for
data mining tasks. Now, we give a brief description about these
classifiers.
1) Naive Bayes: It is a simple probabilistic classifier based
on the Bayes’ theorem. It assumes all classification features
to be independent of one another and works best when the
dimensionality of inputs is very high. An advantage of using
this model is that it does not have a large training data
requirement for parameter estimation and classification. It uses
variance of variables in each class and is also not sensitive to
irrelevant features.
2) Decision Tree: It is a popular classification method that
uses decision tree as a predictive model. It uses a rule based
approach to observe data features and make inferences about
item’s target value. Decision Tree starts at the root and makes
binary (yes / no) decisions at each level until it reaches the
leaf node.
23http://twitterfeed.com/
24https://api.tweetdeck.com/
25https://api.tweetdeck.com/
3) Random Forest: This classifier consists of multiple
decision trees and outputs the class which is the mode of
the classes output by individual trees. For each data point,
it randomly chooses a set of features for classification. It uses
averaging to select most important features, hence improve
the predictive accuracy and control over-fitting. It can run
efficiently on large databases.
C. Training and Testing Data
We divided the labeled-dataset into training (75%) and
testing data (25%). Ten fold cross validation was applied on the
training data over all classifiers. Here the data was partitioned
into 10 subsets. In each test run, 9 subsets were used for
training and 1 was used for testing. This process was repeated
10 times and average accuracy of each classifier was analyzed.
The remainder 25% testing data was then supplied to determine
the actual performance of the classifier on an unlabeled dataset.
D. Classifier Evaluation
We already defined the feature set and machine learning
algorithms used in our classification. This section describes
the evaluation metrics and results we obtained from our
experiments based on the ground truth dataset.
1) Evaluation Metrics: Two major metrics that we used
for the evaluation of our classifier are F-measure (FM) and
accuracy (A). F-measure is defined in terms of precision (P)
and recall (R). Precision (Equation 2) is the proportion of
predicted positives in the class that are actually positive, while
recall (Equation 3) is the proportion of the actual positives
which are predicted positive. This dependency can be better
described by a confusion matrix as presented in Table II. Each
Predicted Class
Malicious Benign
Actual Class Malicious TP FNBenign FP TN
TABLE II: Confusion matrix showing relation between True Positives
(TP), False Positives (FP), True Negatives (TN), and False Negatives
(FN).
row of the confusion matrix represents the instances in an
actual class, whereas each column represents the instances
in a predicted class. Confusion matrix is very useful in
understanding the relation between true positives (correctly
identified values), false positives (incorrectly identified values),
true negatives (correctly rejected values), and false negatives
(incorrectly rejected values). With this knowledge, F-measure
and accuracy can be easily computed. F-measure (Equation 4)
is a weighted average of precision and recall, and accuracy
(Equation 5) is the closeness of measurements to the actual
value.
P = TP/(TP + FP ) (2)
R = TP (TP + FN) (3)
FM = 2 ∗ (P ∗R)/(P +R) (4)
A = (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN) (5)
2) Evaluation Results: We now describe the results ob-
tained from our classification experiments. We trained and
tested 3 classifiers using 7 features described in Section V-A.
The true positive dataset was split into 75% training and 25%
testing set. The classifiers were trained on a ground truth
of 5,926 malicious and 6,074 benign short URLs and 10
fold cross validation was applied. At last, we evaluated our
classifier on the remainder 25% dataset (2,074 malicious and
1,926 benign Bitly URLs). Table III presents the outcome from
each of these classifiers.
Evaluation Metric Naive
Bayes
Decision
Tree
Random
Forest
Accuracy 72.15% 78.37% 80.43%
Recall (malicious) 73.10% 82.40% 81.00%
Recall (Benign) 71.10% 74.10% 79.90%
Precision (malicious) 73.10% 77.40% 81.20%
Precision (Benign) 71.10% 79.60% 79.60%
F-measure (malicious) 73.10% 76.70% 81.10%
F-measure (benign) 71.10% 76.70% 79.70%
TABLE III: Results of classification of malicious Bitly URLs using
all 7 features.
As we moved from Naive Bayes to Decision Tree, the
accuracy and F-measure increased for malicious as well as
benign class. With Random Forest, both these metrics in-
creased even further which can be attributed to the point
that it considerably reduces false positives in our classifica-
tion. Hence, we achieved an overall accuracy of 80.43% and
weighted average of F-measure as 80.40%. We understand
that our training dataset is a mix of Bitly links that receive
and do not receive clicks. Out of the 8,000 malicious links
in our labeled-dataset, we found that 3,693 (46.16%) links
were never clicked. Although this property itself serves as
a feature in the classification, we believe that our classifier
should perform even better if we segregate all links with zero
clicks. This is because such links can be easily classified using
only Non-Click based features. Hence, we separated Bitly
links with zero clicks and obtained a true positive malicious
dataset of 3,693 from a total of 8,000 links. We also randomly
selected 3,693 benign links with no clicks from the labeled-
dataset and performed our classification experiments again
by removing Click based features. Table IV gives the results
from this classification. As expected, an increase in the overall
accuracy and F-measure for each classifier was observed. With
Random Forest, we achieved an accuracy of 86.41% and
weighted average of F-measure as 86.40%. When the complete
labeled-dataset was tested again by excluding Click based
features, maximum accuracy reached 83.50% and F-measure
for malicious class increased to 84.1%.
Previous studies on phishing also shows that Random
Forest works the best as compared to other classifiers [9], [17].
In order to further inspect the performance of Random Forest,
we analyzed the confusion matrix for complete as well as Non-
Click labeled-dataset (Table VI). For complete labeled-dataset,
we could correctly identify 81% of malicious short URLs but
19% were misclassified as benign. On a manual inspection of
some of these misclassified profiles, we observed their click
pattern to be quite similar to that of the benign profiles. In case
of Non-Click labeled-dataset, the correct classification rate
reached 89.60% and misclassification rate dropped to almost
half (10.40%). Also, on removing Click based features from
complete labeled-dataset, true positive increased to 84.20%
and false negative decreased to 15.8%. This indicated that
our Non-Click based features are alone good at classifying a
malicious Bitly link, irrespective of looking at its click history.
Although our proposal is capable of capturing the click patterns
of a link, it can be particularly helpful to detect malicious Bitly
links even before they are clicked.
Evaluation Metric Naive
Bayes
Decision
Tree
Random
Forest
Accuracy 80.02% 85.06% 86.41%
Recall (malicious) 79.60% 89.50% 89.60%
Recall (Benign) 80.40% 80.80% 83.40%
Precision (malicious) 79.30% 81.50% 83.60%
Precision (Benign) 80.70% 89.10% 89.50%
F-measure (malicious) 79.50% 85.30% 86.50%
F-measure (benign) 80.50% 84.80% 86.30%
TABLE IV: Results of classification of malicious Bitly URLs using
only Non-Click based features.
3) Feature Ranks: Some features in machine learning clas-
sification are more important than others. Now we describe the
most informative features based on their ranks using Weka’s
InfoGainAttributeEval package for attribute selection. 26 This
technique evaluates the worth of an attribute by measuring the
information gain with respect to the class. Table V gives the
ranked feature lists for classification experiments on complete
dataset. On a mix dataset of clicked and non-clicked links,
Rank Feature
1 Type of referring domains
2 Difference between Link and domain creation
3 Domain age
4 Link creation hour
5 Type of encoders
6 Link creation-click lag
7 Number of encoders
TABLE V: Feature rank based on information gain for classification
on complete labeled-dataset.
Type of referring domains is found to be the most discrimi-
nating feature. Malicious Bitly links usually have more direct
referrers, i.e. such links are propagated more through email
clients, mobile applications, SMS, etc. Such sources are often
targeted by spammers because they have a direct impact on the
user, which increases the chances for a malicious link to be
seen and visited. Difference between Link and domain creation
is another important feature based on information gain. As
seen in Section IV-A, offenders buy cheap domains for the
deliberate purpose of spamming. Such domains are mostly
registered for a short time span with the objective to fully
exploit them before they expire. The third most informative
feature Domain age highlights the same.
Another strategy adopted by spammers is to shorten links
at odd hours of the day, as depicted by the fourth most
26http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/attributeSelection/
InfoGainAttributeEval.html
informative feature Link creation hour. Type of encoders, Link
creation-click lag, and Number of encoders are found to be
comparatively less informative and did not help much in the
classification. For our Non-Click dataset, Link creation hour is
observed to be the most important feature. Remaining features
follow the same ranking pattern as in the complete dataset.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our initial analysis gave an overview of some characteris-
tics of malicious Bitly links and their propagation on OSM.
Spammers buy cheap domains for a dedicated purpose of
spamming, which eventually die out after targeting a signif-
icant number of victims. We found that spammers exploit
Bitly’s policy of not imposing a cap on the number of con-
nected Facebook / Twitter accounts. We traced such spammers
and detected 3 malicious communities which operate across
Bitly and Twitter. We then unveiled some loopholes in Bitly’s
security policies. Bitly could not effectively detect malicious
URLs already tracked by the popular blacklist services like
APWG and VirusTotal. Leaving this aside, we also observed
a lack of effectiveness in using the claimed detection services
(like SURBL) by Bitly. Malicious users are found to abuse
Bitly’s no account suspension policy. About sixteen percent
malicious users in our dataset shortened only suspicious links
in their history without being noticed. Bitly asserts that it
forbids such users from shortening more links, but we identi-
fied users who kept shortening malicious links for close to 2
years and their state of detection is still unknown. We also
highlighted how a by-passable Bitly warning page is only
partially effective to curtail the problem of spam.
At last, we proposed a mechanism to detect malicious links
on Bitly. We identified features from Bitly and coupled them
with some domain specific features to classify a Bitly URL as
malicious or benign. Computation of these features required
close to 50 seconds per Bitly URL. Our classifier predicted
malicious links with the best accuracy of 80.40% on a mix
dataset of clicked and non-clicked links. By eliminating Click
based features, our classifier attained an improved accuracy
of 83.51% on the mix dataset, and 86.41% on the Non-Click
dataset. Thus, our algorithm is not only efficient in detecting
malicious Bitly links when they receive clicks, but can also
identify them much before they target the netizens. This shows
that in addition to the blacklists and other spam detection
filters, Bitly specific feature set can also be used to detect
malicious content.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Even though our dataset is unique, it is a limited dataset
acquired from Bitly. This dataset captured only links detected
malicious by Bitly in the month of October 2013. Since the
characteristics of spammers evolve over time, we would like to
do a detailed comparative analysis on more exhaustive dataset.
Bitly claims to forbid certain suspicious accounts but does not
give this information through its API. This created a trouble in
interpreting if a dormant suspicious account in our dataset has
been blocked by Bitly or not shortening the links itself. For
malicious Bitly link detection, our classifier currently works
better on Non-Click dataset. This is because we used only 2
Click based features in our classification and links with zero
Malicious Benign
Malicious 81.00% 19.00%
Benign 20.10% 79.90%
Malicious Benign
Malicious 89.60% 10.40%
Benign 16.60% 83.40%
Malicious Benign
Malicious 84.20% 15.80%
Benign 17.20% 82.80%
TABLE VI: Confusion matrix for - (a) complete labeled-dataset; (b) only Non-Click data from labeled-dataset; (c) complete labeled-dataset
by applying only Non-Click based features.
clicks did not have click information. In future, we would like
to do a temporal study of how click patterns on a malicious
Bitly URL evolve over time, which can serve as another good
feature for our classifier. Our feature set can be broadened and
generalized to detect spam from any short URL services. In
addition, we would like to develop a browser extension that
can work in real time and classify any short link as malicious
or benign. Such a service can be very useful in short URL
spam detection across multiple online media.
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